不对称信息下政府最优监管策略研究.docxVIP

摘要 本文考虑了不对称信息下政府最优监管策略的四个问题：资本市场上政府的最优 转移支付和企业最优努力水平，环保补贴的最优合约，公共企业商品生产监管的最 优合约，环境保护的最优监管策略。 首先，我研究了在资本市场上转移支付对政府和企业的影响，得到在不对称信息 下政府达到最优转移支付规模和企业最优努力水平的条件。企业的努力水平与政府 转移支付的大小负相关，企业达到最优努力水平的条件是政府转移支付的边际效用 与企业生产需耍的边际成本相等。 其次，我分析了环保补贴问题最优合约形式及其最优解应满足的条件，提供了如 何从对称信息下的最优解来构造出不对称信息下的最优解的方法。公共企业商品生 产监管中利用定价、补贴和产量三个量设计最优监管合约。 最后，我从实际预算的角度出发，利用逆向选择、博弈论与信息经济学的思想， 研究政府对环境保护的最优监管策略。在以最小化实际污染总量的目标下，当政府 用于保护和治理环境的预算有限吋，监管者应优先监管那些检查出有违规行为成木 较低和那些从污染屮获益较少的行业和企业。 关键词：博弈论，逆向选择，不对称信息，最优监管策略 Abstract In this paper we consider four problems on optimal regulation policy under asymmetric information: optimal transfers and effort levels between government and companies, optimal contracts of environmental subsidies, optimal regulation contracts of public goods, optimal environmental regulation policy. Firstly, we analyze the influence of transfers to government and companies in capital markets and get the conditions of the optimal eflort levels and optimal transfers. Companiesefforts have negative relation with government^ transfers. The condition of companies7 optimal efforts is that the marginal effect of these transfers is equal to the marginal costs of products. Secondly, we analyze the optimal contracts in environmental subsidies and the condition of its solution. Wc oflcr the methods to get the best solution from symmetric information to asymmetric one. And we use price, subsidy and quantity to form the optimal contracts in public goods regulation. Finally, we use adverse selection and game theory methods to analyze an optimal environmental regulation policy under limited budgets. We show that for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and industries and to those firms and industries that value pollution the less. Key words: game theory, adverse selection, asymmetric information, optimal regulation policy. 独创性声明 本人声明所呈交的学位论文是我个人在导师指导下进行的研究工作及取得的研 究成果?尽我所知，除文中已经标明引用的内容外，本