管理者过度自信、公司治理与企业过度投资行为研究——基于东星集团的案例分析.docVIP

PAGE PAGE 3 管理者过度自信、公司治理与企业过度投资行为研究——基于东星集团的案例分析 摘要：企业过度投资一般定义为接受对公司价值而言并非最优的投资机会，特指净现值小于零的投资项目。影响表现为降低公司资金配置效率，浪费企业人力、物力、财力等资源，降低投资回报，最终损害公司价值，不利于公司的长远发展。从管理者视角出发，过度投资一般与委托代理所引发的利益冲突、信息不对称有关；从股东视角出发，过度投资与股东和经理之间利益分歧、控股股东非流通性成本相关；从公司治理角度出发，过度投资与缺乏激励的独立董事制度、效率低下的监事会等相关；从融资结构角度出发，负债融资既可能导致投资不足，也可能导致过度投资；从会计信息质量角度来看，高质量的会计信息会减少过度投资的可能性；从制度层面来分析，GDP作为地方政绩的考核指标由来已久，过度投资能够促进地方政府财政收入的增加，促进就业，是官员职位升迁的保障。 以往分析企业过度投资行为时，一般建立在管理者同质性的基础上，机会主义理论、委托代理理论、信息不对称理论并没有考虑到管理者本身的背景特征。本文从心理学、人口学出发，探究管理者的异质性对于过度投资的影响，以东星集团破产作为案例。主要研究管理者过度自信与企业过度投资之间的关系，同时结合公司治理机制，从公司激励机制、独立董事、管理者持股角度出发，分析一个合理有效的公司治理机制是否可以发挥管理者过度自信与过度投资之间的调节作用。 关键词：管理者过度自信；企业过度投资；公司治理； Overconfidence, corporate governance and enterprise over-investment behavior research —Based on case study of East Star Group Abstract: Enterprise ment project of which NPV is below zero. Over-investment will reduce capital allocation efficiency, waste the corporate human, material, financial and other resources , reduce the rate of return on investment, ultimately damage corpor- ate value and be harmful to long-term development of the company. From the perspective of the manager, the over-investment is generally related to the interest conflicts and asymmetric information aroused by the agency matter between managers and shareholders. From the shareholders perspective, over-investment is related to the divergence of interests between shareholders and managers and non-tradable costs of the controlling shareholders. From the perspective of corporate governance , over-investment is related to the inefficient director system and the inefficient supervisory system. From the perspective of the financing structure, debt financing may lead to underinvest- ment as well as over-investment. From the viewpoint of the quality of account- ing information, high-quality accounting information will reduce the possibility of over-investment. Based on the analysis of the system level, it is a tradition for the GDP to be an important indicator and over-inv