国有商业银行经营者激励约束机制对经营绩效的影响研究.docVIP

摘 要 目前，我国国有商业银行在经营管理方面存在诸多不足。建立健全经营者的激励与约束机制，对于我国国有商业银行深化改革，完善公司治理，提高管理效率和经营绩效，充分发挥国有商业银行在我国经济发展中的作用具有重要的理论意义和应用价值。 本文从公司治理的角度，研究国有商业银行经营者激励约束机制对银行经营绩效的影响。首先，对与研究目标相关的企业绩效理论、公司治理理论、激励约束理论及其国内外研究现状进行梳理和评价，在此基础上构建我国国有商业银行激励约束机制与绩效关系的分析框架，并通过对波特－劳勒综合激励模型的修正，分析了经营者激励约束机制对银行绩效影响的作用机理。然后，通过经营者激励机制对国有商业银行绩效影响的实证分析，发现国有商业银行经营者激励机制的激励效应不强，对银行经营绩效的提高没有显著作用。另外，由于内部约束监督机制的缺陷以及外部约束监督机制的不完善，未能很好地制约国有商业银行经营者的行为，导致决策机制失灵，同时给银行的经营带来巨大的道德风险。最后指出，要发挥国有商业银行经营者激励与约束机制的综合作用，必须完善内部激励约束机制，同时发挥外部市场机制的激励约束作用。 关键词 国有商业银行 经营者 激励机制 约束机制 经营绩效 ABSTRACT At the present time, the state-owned commercial banks in China have a good many deficiencies in management and are deepening reform. The aim is to establish the perfect corporation governance and improve the efficiency of management and bank performance. As the part of the reform, setting up and improving the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers has a great value in theoretical analysis and practical operation. From the corporation governance point of view, the paper ties to make a research on the impact of the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers of the state-owned commercial banks on the bank performances. Firstly, on the base of the reviews of the interrelated theories and studies, the paper sets up the framework to analyze the relationship between the performance and the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers of the state-owned commercial banks, and analyzes the mechanism of the effect of the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers on bank performance. Secondly, through the empirical analysis, it is found that the incentive mechanism to the managers doesn’t have a prominent effect on bank performance. In addition, the inside and outside constraint mechanism cannot restrict the behaviors of the managers of the state-owned commercial banks because of the faultiness of the mechanism. Then it results in the failure in the decision-making mechanism and brings the huge moral hazards