BOT项目投资特许权期决策博弈研究.docVIP

BOT项目投资特许权期决策博弈研究 　　摘要：特许权期的相关规定和特许权期的长度是BOT项目特许权协议中投资者最为关心的问题。特许权期的长度直接决定了政府和项目投资者之间的利益分配。从风险管理的角度，定性地分析BOT项目合理地选择特许权期问题，探讨BOT项目的风险管理、分配和项目特许权期规定之间的内在关系。根据博弈论的理论和方法，定量分析BOT项目特许权期长度最优决策的问题，在不完全信息状态下建立了政府与项目投资者之间的动态博弈模型，通过净现金流与时间的内在关系，运用贝叶斯法则推导出特许权宽限期的长度，并最终得到特许权期长度的最优决策。 　　关键词：BOT项目；特许权期；风险管理；博弈论 　　 Abstract: The relevant regulations and the length of the concession period are the key problems what investors concern in BOT project concession agreement. The length of the concession period directly determines the distribution of interests between the government and project investors. From the perspective of risk management, qualitatively analysis making a reasonable choice of BOT project concession period, discussed the internal relations between BOT project risk management, distribution and project the concession period provisions. According to the game theory and method, quantitatively analysis the optimal decision of BOT project concession period length. Set up a dynamic game model between government and project investors under the state of incomplete information. On the basis of the inner relationship between the net cash flow and the time, deduced the length of the concession grace period by applying Bayes Law, then finally obtained the optimal decision of the concession period length. 　　Keywords: BOT Project; Concession Period; Risk Management; Game Theory 　　中图分类号：F830.59文献标识码：A文章编号：2095-2104(2013) 　　 　　1 引言 　　BOT（Build-Operate-Transfer）项目是指政府部门通过特许权协议，将基础设施特许权在一定时期内转让给私营集团，由私营集团组建项目公司负责项目的投融资、建设、运营和维护，在特许权期满后，再将项目无偿移交给政府[[1]Min C L. Contract design of private infrastructure concessions [D]. Berkeley: University of California, 2000.][[2]Mills G. Welfare and profit divergence for a tolled link in a road network [J]. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 1995, (29): 137-146.][[3]Kumarsawamy M M, Zhang X Q. Governmental role in BOT-led infrastructure development [J]. International Journal of Project Management, 2001, (19): 195-205.]。近年来，BOT模式已越来越多地应用于基