三方代建模式下共同代理问题研究石磊.pdfVIP

29 2 Vol. 29 No. 2 2015 04 Journal of Engineering Management Apr. 2015 116000E-mail leishi@dlut.edu.cn F284 A 20150209105 DOI: 10.13991/j.cnki.jem.2015.02.018 Common Agency Problem in Tripartite Agent Construction Projects SHI LeiLIU An-qi Faculty of Infrastructure EngineeringDalian University of TechnologyDalian 116000ChinaE-mail leishi@dlut.edu.cn Abstract The relationship among project investoruser and construction agent of an agent construction project is a common agency relationship which consists of two principals and one agent. In this papera tripartite agent construction scheme is formulated as a common agency model to investigate the mechanism of how a conflict between the two principals investor and usertriggers construction agents moral hazard. Firstlysupposing there is no conflict between the principals in the single principal-agent model the investment surplus sharing system is shown to be effective to encourage the construction agent to choose the social-optimal effort level. Then in the common agency modelwe find that the conflict of interest between the two principals leads to an incentive failure of investment surplus sharing systemwhich further causes the moral hazard of construction agent. This paper lastly sheds light on application conditions which contribute to the contract design in the engineering practice. Keywords three generation model common agency model investment surplus sharing [4] [1]