利益扩张型虚假城市化现象的激励机制探析——一个基于序贯博弈的分析框架.PDFVIP

利益扩张型虚假城市化现象的激励机制探析 ——一个基于序贯博弈的分析框架 李 学∗ （厦门大学 公共事务学院，福建 厦门 361005） 【摘要】：在国家实施城市化战略的进程中，地方政府以推进城市化为名，利用 现有市制制度与相关政策的缺陷,有选择的进行掠夺性征地，将获取土地增殖的 收益作为基本目标，逃避提供公共服务的职责，致使名义上实现城市化的农民， 未能获取城市化的应有收益，难以获得城市居民对等的公共服务，造成城市化水 平虚假提高，由于其间政府与民众的行为具有强烈的利益扩张冲动，概称之为利 益扩张型虚假城市化现象；它突出表现为在城市的建成区内，存在者大量的农村 建制区域，这种社会现象背后潜存着稳定的制度结构与激励机制，本文以博弈分 析为视角，具体阐释了利益扩张型虚假城市化现象的生成机制。 【关键词】：利益扩张 地方政府 虚假城市化 激励机制 博弈分析 Analysis on Incentive Mechanism of Interests Expansion Fake Urbanization Phenomenon An Analytical Framework Based on Extensive Game Theory Perspective Li Xue (School of Public Administration at Xiamen University, Xiamen Fujian 361005, China) Abstract: During the process of urbanization strategy implementing, In order to seize the profit of land increments, The local government official make full use of the ∗ 李学（1975—），厦门大学公共事务学院讲师，主要研究领域为行政管理学。 1 shortcoming of urbanization mechanism and correlative policy, confiscate the peasant lands with ferociously, evade the responsibility of supplying public services. Therefore, the peasants can’t get the benefits of urbanization and the public services, so the level of urbanization has improved ostensibly. We called the phenomenon as interests expansion fake urbanization, the reason is the behaviors of the local government and the peasants with the impulsion to expand interests; There are a lot of rural administration regions in the city, which is the most prominent sign of this phenomenon. There are stable latent institution structure and incentive mechanism behind the phenomenon. This s