高管薪酬_管理层持股与公司业绩_基于沪市A股经验数据的实证分析_余海宗.pdf

高管薪酬、管理层持股与公司业绩 ——基于沪市A 股经验数据的实证分析 【摘要】随着现代企业制度的建立，上市公司高管薪酬问题一直是社会舆论和学术界关注的热点问题。 随着委托代理理论的逐渐深化，越来越多的上市公司开始对管理层进行股权激励，以解决管理层与所有者 之间的利益冲突。高管薪酬的支付是否能为企业带来相应的业绩？管理层持股是否有助于实现公司价值？ 管理层持股与公司业绩之间存在怎样的关系？本文以2011年上海证券交易所A股上市公司为样本，通过多 元线性回归法分析了高管薪酬、管理层持股对公司业绩的影响情况。最终得到结论：2011年沪市 A股上市 公司的高管薪酬、管理层持股比例都与公司业绩呈显著正相关。并且还发现高管薪酬对于提高公司业绩的 作用较为有限，而进行股权激励会在一定范围内对公司业绩产生较为积极的影响。但管理层持股的激励方 式有赖于高管薪酬的保障，因此两者应当适当配合。笔者认为上市公司在薪酬形式上应当更加多样化，让 管理者在关注公司财务业绩的同时关注公司的市场价值。 【关键词】高管薪酬 管理层持股 公司业绩 Executive Pay, Managerial Stockholding and Company Performance ——Empirical Study on Shanghai A-share Stock Market 【Abstract 】With the establishment of modern enterprise system, the listed company executive pay is always the he hot topic of social public and academic circles. With the deepening the agent theory, more and more listed companies are beginning to implement equity incentive, in order to solve the interest conflicts between management and owners. Whether can executive pay bring the appropriate achievement to enterprise? Whether the managerial stockholding can help to realize the company value? This thesis uses multiple linear regression method to analysis executive pay and managerial stockholding’s influence on company performance. Finally we obtained the conclusion: 2011 Shanghai a-share listed company executive pay and managerial stockholding are significantly positive correlate to company performance. But executive pay plays a relatively limited role to improve the performance of the company, and managerial stockholding will cause a positive effect on companys performance. But the role of managerial stockholding depends on executive pay, thus both shall be appropriately to cooperate. The author thinks that the listed company shall formulate more variety of compensation policy and make managers in the focus on the companys fi