双寡头纵向产品差异化市场的演化博弈分析.pdfVIP

第34卷第4期 东南大学学报(自然科学皈) Vo1．34 No．4 2004年7月 JOURNAI OF SOUTHEAST UNIVERSITY(Natural Science Edition) July 2004 双寡头纵向产品差异化市场的演化博弈分析 石岿然 肖条军 (‘南京大学I‘程管理学院，南京210093) ( 南京丁业大学理学院，南京210009) 摘要：基于一个具有非线性需求函数的纵向产品差异化模型，研究双寡头市场的演化稳定策略． 考虑市场分别存在生产高质量产品和低质量产品的2家企业进行的两阶段博弈问题，企业在第 1阶段选择策略变量(价格或产量)，在第2阶段确定价格的高低或产量的大小．通过博弈分析， 证明了Cournot均衡为子博弈精炼纳什均衡．在此基础上建立了复制者动态系统，运用演化博弈 方法讨论系统各平衡点的局部稳定性，得到了产量策略构成惟一演化稳定策略的结论． 关键词：双寡头市场；纵向产品差异化；演化博弈论；演化稳定策略 中图分类号：F713．54 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1001—0505(2004)04-0523-06 Evolutionary game analysis of duopolistic market with vertical production differentiation Shi Kuiran · Xiao Tiaojun (。School of Management Science and Engineering，Naming University，Nanjing 210093，China) ( School of Sciences，Nanjing University of Technology，Nanjing 210009，China) Abstract：Based on a vertical product differentiation model with nonlinear demand functions．the evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)in a duopolistic market in which a high quality firm and a low quality firm are involved is studied．In the first stage of a two—stage game，the firms choose their strategic variable，price or quantity．In the second stage，they determine the levels of their strategic variables．111e result that the Cournot equilibrium constitutes a sub—game perfect Nash equilibrium is obtained by game analysis．Also，the replicator dynamic system is built and the local stability of the fixed points is discussed from the perspective of the evolutionary game theory．Furtherm ore，the theorem that the quantity strategy is the unique ESS is proved． Key words：duopolistic ma rket；vertical product differentiation； evolutionary game theory；