基于博弈理论的动态入侵响应.pdfVIP

计算机研究与发展 ISSN 1000—12391CN 11-1777，TP Journal of Computer Research and Development 45(5)：747～757，2008 基于博弈理论的动态入侵响应 石 进 陆 音 谢 立 (计算机软件新技术国家重点实验室(南京大学) 南京 210093) (zgnjack@163．corn) Dynamic Intrusion Response Based on Game Theory Shi Jin，Lu Yin，and Xie Li (State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology，Nanjing University，Nanjing 210093) Abstract With recent advances in network based technology and increased dependability of every day life on this technology，assuring reliable operation of network based systems is very important． During recent years，number of attacks on networks has dramatically increased and consequently interest in network intrusion detection and response has increased among the researchers．But as other network security technologies are being widely applied and achieving good results，intrusion detection and response technology is lagging． One reason is that current intrusion detection technology is limited in the detecting algorithm itself，the other is that system’S incentive and alternation of attacker’S strategies isn’t taken into consideration sufficiently in current alerts response research．A dynamic intrusion response model based on game theory(DIRBGT)is proposed to solve the second problem．On the one hand，DIRBGT takes account of incentives of system and attacker across the board。therefore the incentive of system can be assured．And on the other hand，it deals wel1 with attack’S intent and alternation of strategies and therefore the optimal answer iS stable and reliable while the optimal responses inferred from systems alone are unstable．The experimental results show that the DIRBGT model can effectively improve the accuracy and effectiveness of alert response． Key words network security；intrusion response；attack scenario；game theory；dynamic response 摘 要 随着计算机网络的飞速发展，人们对互联网技术的依赖程度越来越高，因此确保网络系统的安