我国工业源碳减排的博弈分析.pdfVIP

总生础济 我国王业源碳减排的博弈分析 蒙瑞海 (广西师范大学经济管理学院，广西桂林 541006) 摘要:碳排放量逐年上升、全球气候变暖等已成为不争的事实。人类进行工业活动被看作是主要原因。工业源在节 能;或排和碳汇决策中的行为方式关系到我国能否实现2020年单位GDP二氧化碳排放要比2005年下降40%~45%的目 标。基于此，文章从博弈理论视角，建立博弈模型探究工业源碳减排，分析了完全信息下均作为理性经济人 的工业协会与工业企业之间、工业源企业之间采取不同的策咯对工业源碳;或排的效果。研究结果表明:工业协会的 监管、工业源之间的相互合作以及工业协会与工业源之间相互协作可以对工业源碳减排发挥很大的作用，实现效用 最大化:其次，工业源生产收益越高、;或排成本越小、减排获得的企业形象收益越高、工业协会对减排一方补贴越 高、工业协会对不减排惩罚度越高时，工业源选择进行碳减排的概率很大。最后，基于研究结论提出促进工业源破 ;或排的政策建议，以期为相关部门提供现实意义的参考。 关键词:博弈;工业源:碳减排 文献引用:蒙瑞海，我国工业源碳减排的博弈分析[J]. 生态经济， 2012 (l0) : III ~ 115. 中国分类号: F424 文献标识码:A Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction of China s Industrial Source MENG Ruihai (School of Business Administration , Guangxi Normal University, Guilin Guangxi 541006, China) Abstract: Carbon emissions rising and global warming has become an indisputable fact in the world. Human industrial activities are looked as the main reason to cause them. And the behavior of industrial sources in the decision-making of energy conservation and carbon sequestration related to whether our ability to achieve the target of carbon dioxide emissions per unit GDP decreased by 40% to 45% in 2020 than in 2005 or not. Based on this , from the perspective of game theory, the research sets up game model to explore carbon emission reduction ofthe industrial source, and analyzes the effect of industrial associations and industrial enterprises , among industrial sources as rational economic man to adopt different strategy to reduce carbon emission. The results show that: the supervision of the Industry Association , the mutual cooperation between the industrial