管理者-员工纵向信任行为分析——基于序贯互惠quot;囚徒困境quot;博弈模型.pdfVIP

预测 FO民ECASTING Vo l. 30. No.2 2011 年第2 期 管理者一员工纵向信任行为分析 一一基于序贯互惠囚徒困境博弈模型 钱峨峙1.2. 蒲离健l (1.重庆大学经济与工商管理学院，重庆 400044; 2. 重庆工商大学财政金融学院，重庆 400067) 摘 要:本义就管理者一员工纵向信任行为的问题，在一般化假设的~础上，建立了同时考虑了员工的物质效用 和.i.怠心理效用的序赏互怠囚徒因境博4年模型，进行了定量的分析，分析结果农明:当管理者首先实施不信 任行为时，先导员工具有完全攻性或互惠动机不够大时，员工倾向于选择实施不信任行为;而当管级者首先，实施信 任行为时，如果员工互急动机足够大，则员工会选择实施信任行为，如果员工的互怠动机处于两者之间时，则会 以一定概且事实施仿份竹为。 关键词:管理者…员工纵向信任;互惠;序贯博弈;囚徒困境 文意编号:1003-5192(2011)02-0046-05 中团分类号:F224.32 文献标识码:A Analysis on Manager-employee Longitudinal Trust Behavior 一一-Based on Prisoner s Dilemma Game Model of Sequential Reciprocity l 1 QIAN Jun-feng ,2 , PU Y ong-jian (1. College 0/ Economics and Business Administration , Chongqing Vniversity. Chongqing 400044. Chinα; 2. Public Finance and Finance School , Chongqing Technology and 8usiness Vnivers时， Chongqing 400067. China) Abstrad: The paper constmcts a prison衍， 8 dilemma game model of sequentíal reciprocíty consídering both material util. ity and reciprocity psychological utility of employees based on the general hypothesis and makes a quantificational analy蝴 sis. The re川lts show that employees who are ratíonal or don t have enough recíprocity motivation won I conduct Ims! behavior after the mistmst behavior conducted by manager. The employees who have enough reciprocity motivation will conduct tmst behavior after tmst behavior conducted hy manager and they wi1l conduct tmst behavior with certain proha- bility when their reciprocity motivati