绿色供应链中政府与核心企业进化博弈模型.pdfVIP

系统工程理论与实践 2∞7 年 12 月 第 12 期 文章编号:1 ∞0-6788(2∞7) 12-0085-05 绿色供应链中政府与核心企业进化博弈模型 朱庆华，窦一杰 (大连理工大学管理学院，大连 11ω24) 摘要: 为探究绿色供应链中政府与核心企业的博弈过程，在分析政府和企业在不同策略下各自的成本 和收益基础上，运用进化博弈理论研究了政企双方的博弈关系.博弈分析结果显示:核心企业开展绿色 供应链管理的成本和收益、政府对企业是否开展绿色供应链管理的奖惩力度，都直接影响博弈结果;政 府和核心企业两个群体，在三种情况下存在进化稳定策略.政府和企业为了获得长远的利益，政府制定 不断严格的环保法规，加大奖惩力度;核心企业应首先主动实施环境管理，积累相关环保经验，并进一步 影响其上下游的企业，这是政府和企业保护环境、双方实现长期共赢的必由之路. 关键词: 绿色供应链管理;进化博弈;复制动态 中图分类号: 白72 文献标志码: A An Evolutionary Model between Govemments and Core-enterprises in Green Supply Chains ZHU Qi吨-hua ， DOU Yi …jie (School of Managemet , Dalian Univ of Tech , Dalian 116024 , China) Abstract: In order to investigate .the g田ne between governmen恼 and core-enterprises in green supply chains , this paper analyses their respective costs and benefits , and studies the game status by evolutionary game theory. Game analysis shows: core-enterprises costs and benefits to implement green supply chain management , subsidies and punishments from governments direcÙY affect 由e g田ne results; there 缸e three evolutionary stable slrategie in three cases. To gain long-term benefit , governments should enact increasingly strict environmental regulations , and increase relevant subsidies and punishment; core-en怡rprises need to proactively implement environment management , and accumulate environmental experience , and then further affect upstre田n and downstream enterprises. It is the only way to realize win-win strategy between governments and core-enterpri田s in the long r