逆向供应链群体演化的Stackelberg博弈分析.pdfVIP

第 30 卷第 l 期 深圳大学学报理工版 Vo l. 30 No. 1 2013 年 1 月 JOURNAL OF SHENZHEN UNIVERSITY SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING Jan. 2013 [交通物流/ Transportation Logistics] 逆向供应链群体演化的 5tackelberg 博弈分析 易俊 暨南大学财务与国有资产管理处，广州 510632 摘 要:建立具有群体演化特征的逆向供应链斯塔克伯格(Stakelherg) 博弈模型，分析逆向供应链上 游制造商或回收厂的机会主义行为，指出幼稚的下游个体商贩群体面临分拣、未加处理和掺杂 3 种回 收策略，并与老练的上游制造商进行价格竞争.仿真分析表明，若制造商或回收厂遵守按质论价的口 头协议，则双方演化稳定均衡为帕累托最优;若制造商或回收厂为机会主义行为类型，则演化稳定均 衡结果取决于个体商贩中采取分拣策略所占比例大小. 关键词:供应链;博弈论;逆向物流;演化算法;演化博弈;斯塔克伯格博弈;废品回收;个体商贩群 中图分类号: F 205 文献标志码: A doi: 10. 3724/SP. J. 1249.2013.01103 Stakelberg game analysis of reverse supply chain with group evolutionary characteristic Yi Jun Department of Finance and State-owned Assets Management , Jinan University , Guangzhou 510632 , P. R. China Abstract: The itinerant traders and their family workshops hecome the mainly recycle models of Chinese reverse supply chain. The Stackelberg game model of reverse supply chain is huilt considering the group evolutionary characteristic. The itinerant traders are the puerile group facìng three strategies , i. e. , the sorting , the untreated and the adulteration , and the manufacture/ recovery plant is the experienced individual player taken the second action. Both groups make the price competition. The results show that the evolutionary equilihrium result of re- verse supply chain is the sorting and the higher recycling price , if the manufacture/ recovery plant oheys the oral contract of pricing by quality. However , if the manufacture/recovery plant takes the opportunism hehavior , the evolutìonary equìlìbrium result d