委托代理理论视角下我国食品安全监 管主体制度分析.pdfVIP

Abstract From the regulation design point of view, Chinas food safety regulatory system is a subject of the public interest theory of regulation which uses to explain and defend. The public interest theory of regulation seen the government like a man who is kind-hearten and do every thing possible. This view reflected the design of the system which is the lack of incentives for law-executor and weak supervision. Lax enforcement of food safety regulator is the best interpretation of the status quo. From the perspective of economics, Chinas food safety department just consider the agent to the citizen. From the perspective of principle-agent theory to the relationship between citizen and government, the objective is different. If you do not participate in the constraint from the system level to solve two fundamental problems and incentive compatibility, you can not reduce or eliminate food safety supervision department of adverse selection and moral hazard behavior. Based on in-depth analysis of Chinas food safety supervisions which is lack of enforce and the real institutional roots. it is recommended to the perspective of principle-agent theory replace public interest theory of regulation. In order to prevent the main body of adverse selection and moral hazard behavior in Chinas food safety mark. Addition to the introduction of this article is divided into five parts: Introduction: this paper seeks to clarify the background, review research purpose and significance. The first part of article ：examine the status quot of Chinas food safety regulation enforcement.