我国食品安全监 管中的委托-代理问题及其法律对策分析.pdfVIP

Abstract The topic of this paper: Food safety supervision right is one of the functions of the government as the social administrators which should be responsible for. From the perspective of information economics, Chinas food safety supervision departments of all the levels are just the agent of food safety supervision rights for all the public. And there exists the principal-agent relationship between the social public which are the principals and them. In the information economics literature, it is often referred as the “agent”, the participants who have the information in the game, participants those who do not have the information are referred as “principal”. In the food safety supervision relationship, agent is for the government, the principal is for the public. It belongs to the Moral hazard with hidden action model, the principal can only observe a result, but he cannot observe the action of agent itself and the state of nature itself directly. In this model, the social public d the supervision right based on the trust in the food safety regulators, but the delivery is just a kind of legal fiction, there exists the virtual agent phenomenon in the reality. In theory, the principal and agent also tend to the differences in the objective function. The agent (government regulators) may be inadequate and goodness to perform the duty of the agent because of self-interest and be abusing the regulatory power, and distort the food safety regulatory effect, because of non-market in the agency relationship, it will damage the interests of the principal due to the improper exercise of the food safety supervision. At the same time, the food safety supervision system exists the multiple agents and the agent l