《工业组织与竞争策略》全套英文知识点（精华）.pptVIP

Chapter 6: Price Discrimination: Nonlinear Pricing * Non-linear pricing and welfare 4 Menu pricing is less straightforward suppose that there are two markets low demand high demand Price Quantity Price Quantity MC MC Uniform price is PU Menu pricing gives quantities Q1s, Q2s PU PU QlU QhU Welfare loss is greater than L Welfare gain is less than G Qls Qhs L G High demand offered the socially optimal quantity Low demand offered less than the socially optimal quantity Chapter 6: Price Discrimination: Nonlinear Pricing * Non-linear pricing and welfare 5 Price Quantity Price Quantity MC MC PU PU QlU QhU Qls Qhs L G = (PU – MC)ΔQ1 + (PU – MC)ΔQ2 = (PU – MC)(ΔQ1 + ΔQ2) ΔW G – L A necessary condition for second-degree price discrimination to increase social welfare is that it increases total output It follows that “Like” third-degree price discrimination But second-degree price discrimination is more likely to increase output Chapter 9: Static Games and Cournot Competition * Static Games and Cournot Competition Chapter 9: Static Games and Cournot Competition * Introduction In the majority of markets firms interact with few competitors – oligopoly market Each firm has to consider rival’s actions strategic interaction in prices, outputs, advertising … This kind of interaction is analyzed using game theory assumes that “players” are rational Distinguish cooperative and noncooperative games focus on noncooperative games Also consider timing simultaneous versus sequential games Chapter 9: Static Games and Cournot Competition * Oligopoly theory No single theory employ game theoretic tools that are appropriate outcome depends upon information available Need a concept of equilibrium players (firms?) choose strategies, one for each player combination of strategies determines outcome outcome determines pay-offs (profits?) Equilibrium first formalized by Nash: No firm wants to change its current strategy given that no other firm changes its current strategy Chapter 9: St