企业纳税信用行为选择与政府税收治理杠杆.docVIP

企业纳税信用行为选择与政府税收治理杠杆 魏修建 姜博 吴刚 西安交通大学经济与金融学院 陕西省社会科学院经济研究所 X 关注成功！ 加关注后您将方便地在 我的关注中得到本文献的被引频次变化的通知！ 新浪微博 腾讯微博 人人网 开心网 豆瓣网 网易微博 摘????要： 企业的趋利性使其能够在政府的博弈过程中, 通过“失信—诚信”纳税行为选择来实现效用最大化。基于企业纳税行为效用视角, 构建企业“失信—诚信”纳税行为效用博弈模型, 分析在政府以“惩戒—奖励”政策为特征的正、反向治理杠杆策略下, 企业行为选择的内在机理。并基于陕西传统制造业企业纳税信用记录截面数据, 分析政府治理对各类型企业纳税信用风险差异存在的外在影响, 进而验证政府治理杠杆效应。同时提出对企业纳税行为的杠杆化、差别化、内生化治理理念, 建议合理运用“惩罚—奖励”政策杠杆, 约束企业纳税行为, 提高企业诚信纳税意识;实施企业纳税信用差异化管理, 制定差别化政策, 规范企业纳税行为;从政府治理、规范业务、提升服务等角度培植企业自觉纳税的内生动力。 关键词： 纳税信用; 行为选择; 政府治理; 制造业企业; 作者简介：魏修建 (1962-) , 男, 西安交通大学经济与金融学院教授, 博士生导师, 电子商务系主任。 收稿日期：2017-04-17 基金：国家社会科学基金项目 (14BJL098) The Choice of Corporate Tax Credit Behavior and the Government Revenue Management Lever WEI Xiujian JIANG Bo WU Gang Shool of Economics and Finance, Xi′an Jiaotong University; Economic Research Institute, Shaanxi Academy of Social Sciences; Abstract： The profit of the enterprise makes it possible to maximize the utility from the government through the game of″honesty and dishonesty″.Based on the perspective of enterprise tax behavior utility, this paper analyzes the internal mechanism of enterprise behavior choice under the″positive and negative″lever strategy by constructing enterprise″dishonesty — honesty″tax behavior game model.Taking tax credit record data of Shaanxi traditional manufacturing enterprises as an example, this paper verifies the effect of government leverage by analysis the external influence of the governance on the tax credit risk of various types of enterprises, and puts forward the principle of leverage, differentiation and internal governance.And suggests that the policy lever of punishment—reward should be used rationally, the corporate tax behavior be restrained, and the corporate integrity tax awareness be improved;In addition, the differentiated management of corporate tax credit be implemented, differentiated policies be formulated and the tax behavior of enterprises be standardized.Thus, the endogenous driving force of enterprises′voluntary taxa