国外博弈论课件lecture17.ppt

June 12, 2003 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 17 June 12, 2003 Lecture 17 Dynamic Games of Complete Information Dynamic Games of Complete and Imperfect Information Outline of dynamic games of complete information Dynamic games of complete information Extensive-form representation Dynamic games of complete and perfect information Game tree Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium Backward induction Applications Dynamic games of complete and imperfect information More applications Repeated games Today’s Agenda Review of previous class Bank runs (2.2.B of Gibbons) Tariffs and imperfect international competition (2.2.C of Gibbons) Dynamic (or sequential-move) games of complete information A set of players Who moves when and what action choices are available? What do players know when they move? Players’ payoffs are determined by their choices. All these are common knowledge among the players. Dynamic games of complete information Perfect information A player knows Who has made What choices when she has an opportunity to make a choice Imperfect information A player may not know exactly Who has made What choices when she has an opportunity to make a choice. Information set Gibbons’ definition: An information set for a player is a collection of nodes satisfying: the player has the move at every node in the information set, and when the play of the game reaches a node in the information set, the player with the move does not know which node in the information set has (or has not) been reached. All the nodes in an information set belong to the same player The player must have the same set of feasible actions at each node in the information set. Information set: illustration Perfect information and imperfect information A dynamic game in which every information set contains exactly one node is called a game of perfect information. A dynamic game in which some information sets contain more than one node is called a game of imperfect information. Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium A Nas