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国外博弈论课件lecture9.ppt

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国外博弈论课件lecture9

May 30, 2003 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 9 May 30, 2003 Lecture 9 Static (or Simultaneous-Move) Games of Complete Information Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Outline of Static Games of Complete Information Introduction to games Normal-form (or strategic-form) representation Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies Nash equilibrium Review of concave functions, optimization Applications of Nash equilibrium Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Today’s Agenda Review of previous class Examples Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Mixed Strategy: A mixed strategy of a player is a probability distribution over the player’s strategies. Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium A probability distribution for each player The distributions are mutual best responses to one another in the sense of expected payoffs Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium: 2-player each with two pure strategies Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium: A pair of mixed strategies ((r*, 1-r*), (q*, 1-q*)) is a Nash equilibrium if (r*,1-r*) is a best response to (q*, 1-q*), and (q*, 1-q*) is a best response to (r*,1-r*). That is, v1((r*, 1-r*), (q*, 1-q*)) ? v1((r, 1-r), (q*, 1-q*)), for all 0? r ?1 v2((r*, 1-r*), (q*, 1-q*)) ? v2((r*, 1-r*), (q, 1-q)), for all 0? q ?1 2-player each with two strategies Theorem 1 (property of mixed Nash equilibrium) A pair of mixed strategies ((r*, 1-r*), (q*, 1-q*)) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if v1((r*, 1-r*), (q*, 1-q*)) ? EU1(s11, (q*, 1-q*)) v1((r*, 1-r*), (q*, 1-q*)) ? EU1(s12, (q*, 1-q*)) v2((r*, 1-r*), (q*, 1-q*)) ? EU2(s21, (r*, 1-r*)) v2((r*, 1-r*), (q*, 1-q*)) ? EU2(s22, (r*, 1-r*)) Mixed strategy equilibrium: 2-player each with two strategies Theorem 2 Let ((r*, 1-r*), (q*, 1-q*)) be a pair of mixed strategies, where 0 r*1, 0q*1. Then ((r*, 1-r*), (q*, 1-q*)) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if EU1(s11, (q*, 1-q*)) = EU1(s12, (q*, 1-q*)) EU2(s21, (r*, 1-r*)) = EU2(s22, (r*, 1-r*)) That is, each pla

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