职工监事、经济民主与企业内收入分配——央企上市公司的经验证据.docVIP

职工监事、经济民主与企业内收入分配 ——央企上市公司的经验证据 杨瑞龙刘诚党力 职工监事作为-项体现经济民主的重要公司治理机制，其效果却普遍不被看好， 而II缺乏相关实证检验。以中国2005—2014年上市央企及其子公司为样本，用 企业内部收入分配情况测度经济民主实现程度的研宄发现:职工监事没有起到缩 小职工和高管收入差距的经济民主作用，职工监事的权利只是名义上的；职工监 事可能被高管俘获，脱离经济民主的本意;职工监事的设罝存在“形式化”问 题。这些结论对于工会、员工持股等其他体现经济民主的公司制度改革具有重要 的参考价值。 关键同： 职T监事;经济民主;企业内收入分配;央企上市公司； 杨瑞龙:中国人民大学经济学院教授，傅士生导师（北京100872）; 刘诚:经济学傅士，中国社会科学院财经战略研究院助理研究员（北 京 100028）; 党力:经济学，全国社会保障棊金理事会资产配置研允员（北京 100032） 基金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“国有企业分类改革战略下的 混合所有制：效率评估与模式选择” （15JJD790034） Employee Supervisors, Economic Democracy and Enterprise Income Distribution:Evidence from the Listed Central Enterprises of China YANG Rui-long LIU Cheng DANG Li School ofEconomics, Renmin University of China: National Academy of Economic Strategy, CASS; National Council for Social Security Fund; Abstract： Employee supervisors are the main embodiment of the democratic rights of the workers, and yet their effect are always ignored by economic theorists and firms managers. Moreover, there is a lack of empirical test and mechanism analysis for the function of employee supervisors.This paper uses enterprise income distribution to measure the realization of economic democracy by exploring the sample of central enterprises listed companies during the period between 2005 and 2014. We find that employee supervisors neither increase the income of workers, nor effectively constrain executive, because most of them only have the “nominal right” rather than “de factual right” . And employee supervisors may be captured by executives, which is deviated from the original intent of economic democracy. Our further study shows that they have a tendency to be “aristocratic” .These conclusions have some implications for system reforms to protect the rights of employee in corporate governance, such as the building of employee union, and the setting up of employee shareholding plan. Keyword： employee supervisors; economic democracy; enterprise income distribution; central enter prises listed companies; 当前在M有企业混合所有制改革的导向下