game_theory5_博弈论_英文.pptxVIP

Introduction to Game TheoryLecture 5Disclaimer: this presentation is only a supporting material and is not sufficient to master the topics covered during the lecture. Study of relevant books is strongly recommended.Review Dynamic Games SPNE Actions vs. Strategies Summary GamesToday’s PlanReviewGame 1st partDynamic games, Subgames, Subgame Perfect NE (SPNE)Game 1st part result, Game 2nd partActions vs. strategies, Game Results/ 26Review Dynamic Games SPNE Actions vs. Strategies Summary GamesReviewGames of complete and perfect informationStatic Games (Nash Equilibrium)Dynamic Games (Backward Induction)Games of complete but imperfect informationDynamic Games (Subgame perfect NE)Games of incomplete informationStatic Games (Auctions)Dynamic Games (Signaling)/ 26Review Dynamic Games SPNE Actions vs. Strategies Summary GamesReview Static game: players move simultaneously players are not informed about previous actions there is no order in which players move is represented by normal form (table)/ 26Review Dynamic Games SPNE Actions vs. Strategies Summary GamesReviewStatic games with complete and perfect info:Game: players, actions, preferences over outcomesDominance – eliminate systematically worse actions Nash Equilibrium – no one can unilaterally improve their situation; everybody plays best response given other players’ choicesMixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium / 26Review Dynamic Games SPNE Actions vs. Strategies Summary GamesPreviewGames of complete and perfect informationStatic Games (Nash Equilibrium)Dynamic Games (Backward Induction)Games of complete but imperfect informationDynamic Games (Subgame perfect NE)Games of incomplete informationStatic Games (Auctions)Dynamic Games (Signaling)/ 26Review Dynamic Games SPNE Actions vs. Strategies Summary GamesPreview Dynamic game: players move sequentially players are fully inform