The USIdia Nuclear Deal该usindia核协议.docVIP

This research paper has been commissioned by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, but reflects the views of the author and should not be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the Commission. THE U.S.–INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL George Perkovich Executive Summary From the perspective of the global nonproliferation order, what was left out of the civilian program that India will now safeguard is at least as important as what was put in: 8 reactors, all current uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, and the current Indian plutonium breeder reactor program. The NSG-India deal makes the completion of a CTBT and a FMCT less likely, not more likely. It also undermines the legitimacy of the nonproliferation regime and the leadership of the U.S. and other major powers. Indian leaders are not thinking about stopping fissile material production or completing a FMCT in the foreseeable future, despite India’s declared willingness to help negoatiate such a treaty. China’s willingness to limit the size and net capability of the nuclear arsenal it could deploy against India will be especially significant in Indian calculations of when it could stop production. Yet, no one involved in the NSG-Indian nuclear deal sought to engage Beijing in exploring whether and how to limit nuclear competition. The nuclear deal could significantly lower the costs in any Indian cost/benefit analysis of whether to resume nuclear testing. India has already contracted to import fuel from Russia, France and Kazakhstan to alleviate a severe shortage. It could stockpile fuel to protect against the impact of sanctions. The commercial interests of suppliers would bolster those in India who would argue that it could conduct nuclear tests and then sign the CTBT with relative confidence that sanctions would not be applied, would have no practical effect, or would quickly be removed. The nuclear deal has undermined the credibility of U.S. le