鼻咽喉炎治疗方法.pptVIP

Organization Theory and the Theory of the Firm The following summary is based on two chapters in the Handbook of Industrial Organization: Chapter 2 on The Theory of the Firm Chapter 3 on Transaction Cost Economics As the chapters were published in 1989, a great deal of recent research is not included However, key issues and open questions remain substantially the same Main Issues Behavior and organization within the firm is poorly understood relative to interactions between firms in markets; the lack of data probably accounts for much of this gap Even though applied research in this area is difficult, it is important to be aware of the main issues because they have implications for work in other areas For example, firm behavior is the result of a complex joint decision process within a network of agency relationships – employees are not owners If agency problems are sufficiently severe, the firms in question may not maximize their value 1. Limits of Integration What determines the scale and scope of a firm? Perhaps surprisingly, we do not have very good answers to this question It is difficult to specify measurable tradeoffs between the benefits and costs of integration Firms form, so some integration is optimal, but all transactions are not organized in a single firm, so there must be costs to increasing size Williamson (1975, 1985) poses the problem as one of selective intervention: why not combine all firms into one and intervene in their operations only when doing so is profitable? Firm Size Microeconomics texts refer to long run average costs curves that eventually slope up What are the sources of diminishing returns to scale? Lucas (1978) focuses on scarce managerial inputs Geanakopolos and Milgrom (1985) refer to the benefits of coordination balanced against the costs of communication and information acquisition Lucas (1967) focuses on adjustment costs that limit firm growth; Jovanovic (1982) emphasizes imperfect knowledge about ability that limits growth –