拟制性盈余管理员工股票选择权为例.pdfVIP

Management of pro forma earnings: evidence from employee stock options ABSTRACT This study examines the management of pro forma earnings in the context of SFAS 123. The central issue lies in the assumption that firms make decisions on employee stock option and pro form earnings simultaneously. Using a sample from Fortune 1000 with disclosures for the 1995-1998 period and three-stage least-squares, we provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis on firms’ decision process regarding ESOs. Specifically, conditional on reported earnings, firms decide the level of ESO and pro forma earnings simultaneously. Once the level of ESO is decided, firms in turns choose a set of valuation parameters based on the modified Black-Scholes option pricing mode, maintaining pro forma earnings at an acceptable level. Our empirical findings also show that in choosing a high ESO value, firms tend to use short option life and low exercise price. Keywords: Earnings management, pro forma earnings, employee stock option, SFAS 123. 擬制性盈餘管理:員工股票選擇權為例 摘要 本研究以員工股票選擇權為例探討擬制性盈餘之管理，主要問題 在於假設企業員工股票選擇權與擬制性盈餘的決策具有聯立關係。利 用財星雜誌 1000 大 1995 至 1998 的揭露為樣本與使用三階段最小平 方法。所得實證結果支持本研究之假說。詳言之，擬制性盈餘為報導 盈餘減去員工股票選擇權之估計價值，但企業為維持一定水準的擬制 性盈餘，其員工股票選擇權的授予將考慮擬制性盈餘的大小，因而影 響員工股票選擇權之大小，根據員工股票選擇權的大小，進而決定選 擇權之評價參數，實證結果亦發現企業授予高選擇權價值時傾向使用 短行使期間與低行使價格。 1. Introduction For long, management of reported earnings has been a heated research topic in accounting and an important issue for practitioners, and standard setters (Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; McNichols, 2000; Thomas and Zhang, 2000). Responding to this issue, the SEC has