中小企业融资选择中的互助性信用但担保问题分析-analysis of mutual credit but guarantee in financing choice of small and medium - sized enterprises.docxVIP

中小企业融资选择中的互助性信用但担保问题分析-analysis of mutual credit but guarantee in financing choice of small and medium - sized enterprises.docx

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中小企业融资选择中的互助性信用但担保问题分析-analysis of mutual credit but guarantee in financing choice of small and medium - sized enterprises

IV IV or found guilty) and Bengal’s banks of the poor have their original solutions on resolving the problems of information asymmetry. With the comparisons, we can find that joint liability in mutual guarantee can be good incentives, with the effects of reducing company’s information discovery costs, increasing the costs of corporate default as well as expanding corporate operation aggregates. A tripartite transaction model that composed by MGI, SMEs and banks can effectively resolve the problems of adverse selection and the moral hazard caused by information asymmetry. However, it has to be pointed that the joint liability in mutual guarantee has to be operated under certain conditions. Currently the industrial clusters of SMEs in China are developing rapidly, and have reached to a certain scale. The characteristics of industrial clusters themselves are beneficial to the practices of the joint liability in mutual guarantee. There are many advantages on the mutual guarantee agencies backing on industrial clusters. Chinas mutual guarantee is growing rapidly. Practically there are several modes, which, to a certain extent, have effectively alleviated the problem of information asymmetry between banks and SMEs. But at the same time there are also a lot of problems which impede the mutual guarantee brought into play. So another important part of this paper is to explore a more comprehensive organizing framework of mutual guarantee institutions. Key words: The Financing of SME; Mutual Credit Guarantees; Joint Responsibility;Industrial Clusters 第一章 第一章 导言 PAGE PAGE 10 第一章 导言 第一节 研究背景、目的及意义 目前,我国约有 99%的企业是中小企业,中小企业对 GDP 的贡献超过 60%, 对税收的贡献超过 50%,提供了 75%以上的城镇就业岗位。然而,自 2008 年 8 月开始的这场全球性的金融危机给我国中小企业造成了沉重打击。究其原因, 最重要的就是中小企业由于缺乏足够的抵押而造成的融资困难。 中小企业融资是一个世界性的难题,其根源在于银行与企业之间的信息不 对称,而信用担保是目前世界各国为解决该问题所普遍采用的一种金融支持模 式。当前主要的信用担保模式有三种,即:政策性信用担保、商业性信用担保 和互助性信用担保。我国的中小企业信用担保实践起步于 1992 年,代表者是重 庆的私营中小企业互助担保基金会以及上海的工商联企业互助担保基金会和广 东的地方性商业担保公司。根据 1999 年 6 月 14 日,

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