基于共同代理理论的产学研合作研究-企业管理专业论文.docxVIP

II II RESEARCH ON THE INDUSTRY-UNIVERSITY COLLABORATION BASED ON COMMON AGENCY THEORY ABSTRACT The level of effort of the R D team considerably determines the outcome of the project, and the success of the collaboration. However, present research on this topic is inadequate. Therefore, this paper analyzed the relationship among university, enterprise and the R D team in the collaboration, and established mathematical model on the incentive mechanism based on common agency theory. This thesis presumes the signing and execution of contracts in industry-university collaboration as a common agency problem. While the Principles are university and enterprise, and the agent is R D team. Then, the optimization of incentive contract, and maximization of respective profit in the game, is the most important problem up to the surface. Considering this situation, this thesis established three mathematical models: sequential model, cooperative model, as well as the exclusive agent model, in which the university rejects cooperation with the enterprise, and the contract with the R D team is signed with either of them. This thesis also provided the analytical solutions of the models, and conclusion was proposed. The author discovered because of the informational asymmetry, it is difficult to “measure” the effort level of the R D team for the university and enterprise. Consequently, the incentive cost is inevitable in the industry-university collaboration, which stands for the loss of total welfare. This loss is positive related with the risk of outcome, as well as the risk aversion level of the R D team. The fixed payment only affects the distribution of total income among the university, enterprise and R D team, and does not affect the effort level of the R D team. In addition, the author discusses the relationships between the optimal share ratio (of total income) and the risk of output, the unit cost of effort, the degree of risk aversion of the R D team, as well as the