基于企业治污行为的环境税率动态调整机制.docxVIP

基于企业治污行为的环境税率动态调整 机制 涂国平张浩冷碧滨 南昌大学管理学院南昌大学中国中部经济社会发展 研究中心 摘要： 在排污费改为环境税的背景下，为研究环境税率的最优设计，从组织行为的视 角，利用演化博弈理论，建立地方政府和排污企业的演化博弈模型;在静态环境 税率的基础上提出环境税率动态调整机制，并验证该调整机制抑制演化过程中 波动的有效性。结果表明:环境税率动态调整是必要的;适当降低经济指标权重并 提高环境指标权重、提高环境税征收强度、降低政府监测成本均能有效提高排污 企业采取完全治污策略的概率，生产规模较小以及初始治污力度较高的排污企 业最终采取完全治污策略的概率较低。认为应改善上级政府对地方政府的政绩考 核指标;加强税收部门和环保部门之间的协作配合;适当提高环境税征收强度;加 强对小生产规模排污企业的监管。 关键词： 环境税;动态税率;排污企业;治污行为; 作者简介：涂国平(1963—),男，教授，博士生导师， E-mai1: HYPERLINK mailto:tgping@ tgping@ 收稿日期：2017-03-09 基金：国家自然科学基金资助项目 Analysis of Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism for Environment Tax based on Enterprises Pollution Control Behavior TU Guoping ZHANG Hao LENG Bibin School of Management, Nanchang University; Center for Central China Economic Development Research, Nanchang University; Abstract： Under the background that pollution charge had been changed to cnviTonmcnt tax, to study the optimal design of environment tax rate, this article, from the perspective of organization behavior theory, established an evolutionary game model between local government and pollution emission enterprises on the basis of evolutionary game theory. Then the dynamic adjustment mechanism was put forward on the basis of static environment tax rate and it was proved that the mechanism could effectively control the fluctuation in the evolutionary process. The result shows that dynamic adjustment is necessary;reducing the weight of economic indicators, increasing environment tax rate and reducing the cost of government supervision are effective ways to increase the probability of enterprises adopting complete pollution control behavior; enterprises with a small production scale and enterprises which were effectively controlling pollution at the initial stage are least likely to control pollution thoroughly in the end. Some suggestions were put forward to solve the problem, such as improving state government，s asscssmcnt index on local governments, strengthening the cooperation between environmental protection dep