新增食品厂商、监管规制与食品安全.docxVIP

新增食品厂商、监管规制与食品安全 徐翔鲁强 摘要： 基于不完全信息理论下责任制度分析框架，从规制者、原有食品厂商、新增食品 厂商和消费者的四方博弈出发，逐步分解模型中多方博弈主体的行为、收益以及 最优食品安全水平下的约束条件和均衡解。研究发现:政府在把握规制的度的情 况下，食品厂商类别、规制次数对于政府客观公正的监管规制无影响。提高不同 食品厂商的食品合格率是增加消费者满意度、支付意愿以及食品消费规模的关键 举措。同时，保障政府监管和信息传递的有效性是四方博弈主体收益增加的前提。 原有食品厂商和新增食品厂商之间在食品价格、食品质量以及消费者期望效用方 面存在正相关关系。 关键词： 不完全信息;监管规制;食品安全;食品厂商; 作者简介：徐翔(1957-),女,湖南浏阳人,南京农业大学经济管理学院教授； 作者简介：鲁强(1993-),男，安徽阜阳人，南京农业大学经济管理学院硕士生。 收稿日期：2016-04-20 基金：国家自然科学基金资助项目 New Food Manufacturers, Regulation and Food Safety XU Xiang LU Qiang College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Agriculturol University; Abstract： Based on the responsibility system framework of incomplete information theory, in view of quartet game among the regulator, the original food manufacturer, the new food manufacturer and the consumer, this paper con due ts a step-by-step decomposition of di f fere nt par ties behaviors and earn in gs, and tc ars down the constraint and the equilibrium in the opti mal food safety level. The study finds that if the government can handle the extent of regulation well, the type of the food manufaturers, be they new or original, and the frequency of regulation have no effect on the objective and fair regulation of the government. To improve the food qualification rate of the original ( new) food manufacturers is the key to enhance consumers satisfaction degree, payment willingness and food consumption scale. At the same time, guaranteeing the effectiveness government regulation and information transfer is the precondition to increase the revenue of the four parties of the game. There is a positive corrlation between the food price, the food safcty level and consumcr，s expectation utility of the original food manufacturers and those of the new food manufacturers. Keyword： incomplete information; regulation; food safety; food mernufacturers; Received： 2016-04-20 一、引言与文献回顾 食品产业是国民经济和保障民牛的基础性产业,2011年食品工业产值同比增长 31.6%,占国内生产总值的16.5%!11。随着食品产业的迅速发展，食品安全问题屡 禁不止。但是已有研究成果表明，无论基于理论分析、微观调研还是宏观分析， 我国食品安全问题仍为中国