财务管理-责任管理模式.ppt

* Incentive Compatible Contract – Problem Setup Maximize (55,000 – R55)Φ55(e1) + (40,000-R40)Φ40 (e1) Subject to: R55?Φ55(e1) + R40?Φ40(e1) - e12 = 100 R55?Φ55(e1) + R40?Φ40(e1) - e12 ? R55?Φ55(e2) + R40?Φ40(e2) – e22 R55?Φ55(e1) + R40?Φ40(e1) - e12 ? R55?Φ55(e3) + R40?Φ40(e3) – e32 * Incentive Compatible Contract – Specific Solutions Maximize (55,000 – R55)0.8 + (40,000-R40)0.2 Subject to: R55?(0.8) + R40?(0.2) - 36 = 100 R55?(0.8) + R40?(0.2) - 36 ? R55?(0.6) + R40?Φ40(0.4) – 25 R55?(0.8) + R40?(0.2) - 36 ? R55?(0.3) + R40?(0.7) – 16 Solutions: R55 = 21,609 R40 = 8,464 Expected payoffs: Principal = 33,020 Agent = 18,980 * Summary of Different Contracts Event under e1 Principal’s Payoffs Agent’s Payoff Observable Fixed Rent to Prin. Incentive Compat. Observable Fixed Rent to Prin. Incentive Compat. 55,000 (p=0.8) 36,504 32,750 33,391 18,496 22,250 21,609 40,000 (p=0.2) 21,504 32,750 31,536 18,496 7,250 8,464 Expected Payoffs 33,504 32,750 33,020 18,496 19,250 18,980 * What do we know from these? The best case scenario for the principal is when he can observe the agent’s effort level directly. The worst case scenario to the principal appears to be simply charging a fixed rent. The difference between the two ($754) represents the maximum amount to pay for an information system to reveal the agent’s effort. The middle, 2nd best solution (incentive compatible contract) may not always be the next best thing though! * Let’s say that we set the two variables, R55 and R40, to be 18,769 and 11,449 respectively. Effort level Expected utility of the agent E1=6 (18,769?)0.8+(11,449?)0.2-6? = 95 E2=5 (18,769?)0.6+(11,449?)0.4-5? = 100 E3=4 (18,769?)0.3+(11,449?)0.7-4? = 100 Now, the principal is telling the agent NOT to work hard! The $33,159 is actually better than the $33,020 under “incentive compatible” contract! Effort level Expected utility of the principal E1=6 Not a feasible solution, agent’s utility 100 n/a E2=5 (55,000-18,769)0.6+(40,000-11,449)0.4 = 33,15