天气变动风险 对冲和运作管理决策.ppt

Analysis: without a rebate Retailer (qr, pr): Optimal order quantity price ?dr (qr, pr): Max. profit Supplier wd : Wholesale price ?ds (qr, wd ): Max. profit Replace r, d with c: we obtain the solutions for a centralized supply chain Analysis: with a rebate Consider a class of weather rebate scheme Such a rebate scheme can coordinate the supply chain. Supply chain profit can be allocated in any ratio between the supplier and retailer Varying combinations of w and ?, Pareto improvement results Changing t* and k() leads to different risk-sharing among the two Advantages Compared with returns/buyback contract, No physical confirmation is required – temperature record is “public information” Compared with markdown money, Not to protect the margin for the retailer No stipulation on retail prices, sales effort, and how to mark down the unsold Literature Review？ II. Price Postponement Pre-season Stage 1 Season begins Stage 2 1. Supplier offers wholesale price w rebate K() 2. Retailer decides quantity q 3. Updating temp. Retailer sets price and sells: p 4. Supplier pays rebate if any Price Postponement It’s a two-stage Stackelberg “game”: At Stage 2, the retailer decides on selling price, given (t, w, q) At Stage 1, the retailer decides on order quantity q, given distribution of t and w Knowing the response of the retailer, the supplier decides on the wholesale price w With/without a rebate III. An Example Assume the demand function A closed-form solution is obtained Pricing Early/Late With/without rebate, the retailer Order quantity: “price late” “price early” Supply chain profit: “price late” “price early” By how much with a rebate? When ?=1.1, pricing late by a factor of 1.17 (early, 1.27) When ?=1.5, pricing late by a factor of 1.3 (early, 1.7) 延迟定价和回扣是部分相互替代的！ 小结 Introduced and analyzed weather rebate contracts for newsvendor settings that can achi