博弈论课后作业homework1.docxVIP

≥ ≥ 1/2, ? ?10, ?15, 20 0, ?10, 60 0, 10, 10 20, 5, 15 5, ?5, 0 ?5, 35, 15 ?5, 0, 15 ?20, 10, 10 G??? T?????: H??????? ? Instructor: Xiang Sun* Due: September 30, 2013 For Lecture 2: 1. ere are three computer companies, each of which can choose to make large (L) or small (S) computers. e choice of company 1 is denoted by S1 or L1, and similarly, the choices of companies 2 and 3 are denoted Si or Li of i = 2 or 3. e following table shows the profit each company would receive according to the choices which the three companies could make. Find all the Nash equilibria of the game. S2S3 S2L3 L2S3 L2L3 S1 L1 2. Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over how to split one dollar. Both players simultaneously name shares they would like to have, s1 and s2, where 0 ≤ s1, s2 ≤ 1. If s21 + s2 ≤ 1/2, then the players receive the shares they named; if 1 + s2 1/2, then both players receive zero. What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game? Now we changethepayoffruleasfollows: If s21 + s2 1/2,thentheplayersreceivethesharestheynamed;if s2 2 then both players receive zero. What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of this game? 3. ConsidertheCournotduopolymodelwhereinversedemandis P (Q) = a?Q butfirmshaveasymmetricmarginal costs: c1 for firm 1 and c2 for firm 2. What is the Nash equilibrium if 0 ci a/2 for each firm? What if c1 c2 a but 2c2 a + c1? 4. [OR] Exercise 18.2 (first price auction) 5. [OR] Exercise 18.5 (a war of attrition) 6. [OR] Exercise 20.4 (symmetric games) For Lecture 3: 7. e Nash equilibria of a strictly competitive game are interchangeable: if (x,y) and (x′,y′) are equilibria then so are (x,y′) and (x′,y). 8. Consider a first-price, sealed-bid auction in which the bidders valuations are independently and uniformly dis- tributed on [0, 1]. e higher bidder wins the good and pays her bidding price; other bidders gets and pays noth- ing. In the case that there are at least 2 players who win the good, each of them has equal probability to ob