美国社会保障的改革【外文翻译】.pdfVIP

原文二： The social security reform of American Jobs lost during the recent recession caused a deluge of applications to the Social Security Disability Insurance program — more than 6 million each year in 2009 and 2010 — and threw into relief the fact that the SSDI program is structurally unsound. The current applications surge will accelerate the exhaustion of SSDIs trust fund and will force Congress to have to choose among two unpalatable options — increase SSDI payroll taxes or reduce benefit allowance rates. But that is not enough. If the particularly vulnerable population the SSDI is designed to serve is to be protected, while preserving incentives to work, the program has to be radically restructured. Why Get A Job? Even in normal economic times, those with marginally physical or mental impairments apply in the hope of acquiring disabled status under SSDI. Among those already receiving SSDI benefits, the incentive to return to the work force is very poor. Revealing ones ability to work, especially if its in low-paid occupation, could cause permanent loss of SSDI benefits. Strong work disincentives under SSDI result from its eligibility standard that guides benefit awards: an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity for 12 months or more. Professors David Autor of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Mark Duggan of the University of Maryland recently proposed reforming SSDI to solve its twin problems of impending fiscal shortfalls and poor employment incentives. They propose a new front-end universal program of private disability insurance (PDI) paid for out of a new payroll tax to be shared by employers and employees. PDI would provide employment supports to disabled workers with a view of keeping them on the job. It would also provide new subsidies to employers to retain disabled workers on the job. Und