梅耶森的显示原理原文.pdf

IncentiveCompatibilityandtheBargainingProblem

Author(s):RogerB.Myerson

Source:Econometrica,Jan.,1979,Vol.47,No.1(Jan.,1979),pp.61-73

Publishedby:TheEconometricSociety

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Econometrica,Vol.47,No.1(January,1979)

INCENTIVECOMPATIBILITYANDTHEBARGAININGPROBLEM

BYROGERB.MYERSON

CollectivechoiceproblemsarestudiedfromtheBayesianviewpoint.Itisshownthatthe

setofexpectedutilityallocationswhicharefeasiblewithincentive-compatiblemechanisms

iscompactandconvex,andincludestheequilibriumallocationsforallothermechanisms.

ThegeneralizedNashsolutionproposedbyHarsanyiandSeltenisthenappliedtothisset

todefineabargainingsolutionforBayesiancollectivechoiceproblems.

1.INTRODUCTION

INTHISPAPERwewillcons