博弈论基础：同时与序贯博弈分析及应用.pptx

Lecture4

SequentialGames

IntroductionLecture1-3:Simultaneousgames:Prisoner’sdilemma(Ad,NoAd):UniquePSNE,bothplayersdefect.GameswithoutPSNE(shirk/monitor):MSNEistheintuitivee.Coordinationgames:2PSNE1MSNE.Playersmaytrytocoordinate.2

IntroductionLecture4-5:Sequentialgames.Gameswhereplayersmoveoneafteranother.Sequentialgamesareasymmetric.Gamesweplay:chessGamesbusinessesplay:entry,pricing…L4:Subgameperfectequilibrium.L5:Experimentalevidence,andanapplicationtobargaining.3

SequentialgamesLookingforward:Players,whenmakemoves,havetoconsiderhowotherplayerswillreact.Reasoningbackward:Givenotherplayers’reaction,whatismyoptimalstrategy?Asymmetryinorderofplaycausesasymmetryinpayoffs.Itmatterswhoplaysfirstandwhoplayssecond.4

EntrygameTworestaurantchainsmustchoosewhethertoopenornotoopenarestaurantinanewshoppingarea.Ifthegameissimultaneous:2PSNE,1MSNE.5Firm1Firm2EnterDon’tEnter-1,-13,0Don’t0,30,0

EntrygameWhatifFirm1isfirstmover,andFirm2thefollower?GameTrees:allpossiblemoves,andallpossibleeandpayoffs.6Firm1Firm2Firm2EEEDDD-1,-13,00,30,0BranchesNodesPayoffsRoot

SolvingtheGameTreeMethodusetosolvegametree:BackwardInduction,orrollbackStartfromtheend,androllbackuntiltherootDifferencewithsimultaneousgameDroptheconceptofjointbestresponseThereisahierarchyofactions,ofplayers7

SolvingtheGameTreeSubgame:anynodewithallsubsequentnodes:Subgameperfectequilibrium(SPE):TheSPEistheequilibriuminsequentialgames.TheSPEissuchthatplayersstrategiesconstituteaNashequilibriumineverysubgameoftheoriginalgameStartwithterminalnodesandeliminatedominatedactionsfromthegame8ED-1,-13,0Firm2

LookingForward…AndReasoningBack9Firm1makesthefirstmove,andmusttakeintoaccounthowtheresponseofFirm2:Firm1Firm2Firm2EEEDDD-1,-13,00,30,0TheSPEis(E,D)

Discu