家族上市公司控制权与现金流权分离对投资行为的影响.pdfVIP

暨南大学硕士论文 中文摘要 投资作为上市公司的一项重要活动，决定着公司的业绩和发展前景，是公司财务决策 的起点。实际中由于决策过程的复杂性和影响因素的多样性，企业投资行为往往偏离其最 优规模，表现为投资不足或过度投资。当前国内外的大量研究发现，上市公司普遍存在终 极控股股东，而家族企业尤为明显。同时，终极控股股东和中小股东的代理冲突也必然影 响到企业的投资决策。因此，对此情况下家族上市公司投资效率的研究则具有重要的现实 意义。 本文对家族企业、控制权、现金流权以及企业投资效率等相关概念及理论基础进行描 述或界定，确定了家族上市公司控制权、现金流权的计量方法及投资效率的计量模型。以 2007-2009 中国家族上市公司为样本，对其实际控制人控制权实现方式、投资状况、控制 权与现金流权分离对投资效率的影响等方面进行实证研究。 研究发现，家族控制人更多的采用金字塔等复杂结构对上市公司进行控制。另外，当 前中国家族上市公司更多的呈现出投资不足现象。最后，控制权、现金流权的分离加剧了 家族上市公司的投资不足程度，与过度投资有正相关关系但不显著。 关键词：家族企业，控制权，现金流权，投资不足， 过度投资 I 家族上市公司控制权与现金流权分离对投资行为的影响 Abstract Investment as an important activity of listed companies, which determines the companys performance and development prospects, is the starting point for financial decision-making. In reality, companys investment behavior often deviates from its optimal scale, displaying as the under-investment or the over-investment as a result of the complexity of the decision-making process and the diversity of the influence factors. The current domestic and foreign research shows listed companies generally have ultimate controlling shareholders, especially for the family firm. At the same time, the agency conflicts between ultimate controllers and minority shareholders will also affect companies’ investment decision .So the research of investment efficiency of listed family firms is full of practical significance. This article defines family firm, control rights, cash-flow rights and corporate investment efficiency and other related concepts ,then determines the measurement method of listed family firms’ control rights and cash-flow rights and establishes the measurement model of investment efficiency. Taking Chinese listed family firms during2007 to 2009 as the