上市商业银行行长薪酬激励、银行绩效与银行风险实证分析.docVIP

An Empirical Study of Listed Commercial Banks’ Compensation of Governors, Performance and Risk A Thesis Submitted to Chongqing University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Master’s Degree of Economics By Zheng Yan Supervised by Ass. Prof. Lin lue Specialty：Finance College of Economics and Business Administration of Chongqing University, Chongqing, China May 2013 重庆大学硕士学位论文  摘  要  中文摘要  ―次贷‖危机以后，各国金融市场由于遭受严重打击处于萧条或恢复状态。与此 同时，各银行高官们却仍然享有巨额收益，这使得私有收益和社会损失形成巨大 反差，公众对此发出广泛批评之声。在这样的情况下，奥巴马宣布了对华尔街的―限 薪令‖，规定凡是获得政府救助的金融企业高管最高年薪不得超过 50 万美元。此 外，中国也出台了类似的措施，决定从 2009 年起对金融类国有企业进行量化绩效 考评，金融企业绩效评价结果将作为确定金融企业负责人薪酬的重要依据。另外， 由于银行是经营货币的特殊企业，银行经营过程中风险无处不在，而这些风险又 与银行追逐绩效的行为有着很大的关联性。因此，我们不由得思考银行高管薪酬、 绩效和风险这三者的关系。 本文通过采集 2005 年至 2011 年国内 14 家在上交所上市的股份制商业银行的 数据，实证分析了银行行长薪酬与银行绩效之间的关系，并将银行行长薪酬和银 行绩效作为自变量的基础上，进一步检验了银行行长薪酬激励、银行绩效与银行 风险的关系。文章引用了一个模型，并通过该模型对总风险、系统性风险和非系 统性风险进行估算，从而作为衡量银行风险的指标进行回归分析。研究结果表明， 银行行长薪酬与银行绩效、银行风险不存在显著的相关性，但是银行绩效与银行 风险存在正相关关系；另外，银行规模的大小、国有股比重的大小也都是影响银 行风险的重要因素。 关键词：银行行长薪酬，银行绩效，银行风险 I 重庆大学硕士学位论文  英文摘要  ABSTRACT After the 2008 subprime crisis, all the financial markets around the world suffered a lot and they are in a recession or recovery state. However, the governors of the banks still have a big income. This situation forms a big contrast between the private benefits and social loss, so the public were angry with this imbalance. Under this circumstance, Obama, the president of America, was putting limits on the executives’ salary of the Wall Street, which says that the enterprises which received the government assistance shall not give his executives salary more than $500000. Besides, the government of China took a similar measure which would quantize the performance of state-owned financial enterprises and the performance would become a big evidence to decide the level of the governors’ compensation. Banks are special enterprises operating currency, so they face all kinds of risks during their operations. These risks are related to the banks’