半年报自愿审计能否降低代理成本%3f.pdfVIP

半年报自愿审计能否降低代理成本？ 杜兴强 (厦门大学会计系， 福建厦门 361005) 摘 要：管理当局与股东之间的代理冲突是公司治理领域内最为重要的问题之一，而审计被认为是能够缓解信 息不对称、降低代理成本的一种机制。虽然上述观点一直被广泛引用，但至今还未有文献为此提供系统性的经验证据。 利用中国资本市场独特的制度背景，本文手工搜集了上市公司 2002－2009 年半年报自愿审计的数据，实证研究了半 年报自愿审计是否能够降低代理成本这一问题。无论是 Heckman 二阶段模型、OLS 模型、配对研究还是公司层面的 固定效应回归，本文的研究结果都一致地表明，半年报自愿审计的确显著降低了上市公司管理当局与股东之间的代理 成本，从而揭示了审计所具有的信息价值和公司治理作用。进一步，公司选择“四大”与“非四大”进行的半年报自 愿审计，在降低代理成本方面并不存在着系统差异，说明选择半年报自愿审计比选择何种审计师进行审计更为重要。 关键词：半年报 自愿审计 代理成本 自选择 Voluntary Audit, Corporate Governance and Agency Costs Du Xingqiang (Accounting Department, Xiamen University, Xiamen, Fujian, China, 361006) Abstracts: Agency conflict between management and shareholders is one of the most important topics on corporate governance, and auditing is viewed as one of mechinisms to alleviate information asymmetry and reduce agency costs. But there is no literature to examine this argument using archival data though it is quoted frequently. Using the unique setting of China market and handle-collected data of public listed firms’ voluntary semi-annual audit , this paper empirically investigates the argument whether and how voluntary semi-annual audit can reduce agency costs. The results consistently show that voluntary semi-annual audit does reduce significantly agency costs between management and shareholders, suggesting the information value of an audit per se , regardless of the methods of Heckman tow-stages approach, OLS regression, matched sample or firm-level fixed effects regression. Moreover, there is no systematic difference between BIG4 and non-BIG4 in reducing agency costs, indicating that what matters more to shareholders is the presence of voluntary audit rather than the choice between BIG4 and non-BIG4. Key Words: Semi-annual Reports, Voluntary Audit, Agency Costs, Self-selec