不对称信息下逆向供应链激励合同研究包晓英.pdfVIP

第14 卷第9 期 Vol. 14 No.9 2 0 0 8 年9 月 Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems Sep. 2 0 0 8 : 100 - 5911(2008) 09- 1717- 04 不对称信息下逆向供应链激励合同研究 包晓英, 蒲 云 (西南交通大学经济管理学院, 四川 成都 10031) :一个制造商和一个零售商组成的逆向供应链中, 产品的回收量依赖于零售商的回收努力。由于信息 不对称的存在, 制造商无法观测到零售商的回收努力行为, 这样就会产生败德行为, 影响逆供应链的协调。对此, 利用委托代理分析框架, 研究了逆供应链中制造商和零售商之间的利益博弈;分析了信息对称情况下, 不同参数对 回收努力的影响; 并采用特例对非对称情况下保证线性契约机制有效的参数条件进行了分析。 :逆向供应链; 再制造;合同; 信息不对称; 回收努力 :F253.4 : A In cent ive contr act in rever se supp ly chain wit h asymm etr ic informat ion BAO Xiao2y in g , P U Yun (School of Economics Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 10031, China) Abstr act: In the context of a single2manufacturer and single2retailer rever se supply chain, the product returns effi2 ciency depended on retailerps collection effort. However , due to asymmetric informat ion, the manufacturer couldnp t observe the retailersp endeavour s, the immoral action came into being so as to affect the collaboration of t he whole rever se supply chain. To deal with t his problem, the game between manufact urer and retailer was studied from the point of principal2 agency theory. Under symmetric information, different paramet ersp effects on the collection effort level of the retailer were analyzed. And under asymmetric information, the parameters terms to ensure the validity of linear contract were discussed through a special case. Key word s: rever se supply chain; remanufacturing; cont ract; asymmet ric information; collection effort 成的。而在现实中, 制造商可能不会获得零售商的 0