Carbon Emission Allocation and Efficiency of EU Countries英文文献资料.docVIP

Modern Economy, 2012, 3, 590-596 /10.4236/me.2012.35078 Published Online September 2012 (http://www.SciRP.org/journal/me) Carbon Emission Allocation and Efficiency of EU Countries* Ming-Chung Chang Department of Banking and Finance, Kainan University, Taiwan, China Email: changmc@.tw Received June 2, 2012; revised July 1, 2012; accepted July 10, 2012 ABSTRACT Reduction of CO2 emissions is increasingly important among countries that want to protect the environment against global warming and climate change. This study examines two methods of CO2 emission reduction—CO2 emission allow- ance and an international agreement—by applying the Zero Sum Gains Model and the Cooperation and Alliance Model. We conclude that all DMUs reach 100% efficiency after trading on the CO2 emission allowance. The international agreement also improves the average efficiency of all DMUs, but its effect is inferior to the trading of the CO2 emission allowance. Keywords: CO2 Emission Allowance; International Agreement 1. Introduction ance based on a post emission record. In the benchmark- ing principle, the EU ETS allocation rules consider the member states’ production technology and specific pro- duction inputs and outputs. The auctioning principle is for member states to bid on a CO2 emission allowance. Sijm et al. analyze and compare the advantages and dis- advantages among the three regulations for carbon credit allocation and conclude that the auctioning regulation is the best rule to fit economic efficiency [1]. The main objective of our paper is to propose two al- ternative CO2 emission allowance allocation models. We introduce the Zero Sum Gains Data Envelopment Analy- sis (ZSG-DEA) model and the Cooperation and Alliance (CA) model to reallocate the CO2 emission allowance. Both models are applied in our paper to estimate the performances of decision making units (DMUs) given the total amount of CO2 emission requir