大股东控制下的内部资本转移与利益冲突.pdfVIP

第27 卷第2 期 系统丁.理学报 Vo1.27 No.2 2012 年4 月 JOURNAL OF SYSτEMS ENGINEERING Apr.2012 大股东控制下的内部资本转移与利益冲突 龚志文，陈金龙 (华侨大学工商管理学院，福建泉州 362021) 摘要:构建了大股东控制下的企业集团内部资本转移优化模型，定量地椎导了三种情景下的均衡结果、参与各方福 利和影响因素，以此对大股东控制下的内部资本交易行为进行研究.研究发现，理想型内部资本交易实现了资本配 置的最优化和社会福利的最大化，形成参与各方共赢的局面，实现了集团公司财务目标;附加冲突成本的内部资 本交易存在资本转移不足行为，资本交易仍可以持续维持，基本实现集团公司财务目标;侵害型内部资本交易存在 过度转移资本行为，资本交易不可持续，实现的财务目标只能是在损害利益相关者的前提下，追求控股股东财富最 大化. 关键词:内部资本市场;控股股东;资本转移;公司治理 中固分类号:TP273 文献标识码:A 文章编号: 1【刷一5781(2012)02-0224-07 The behavior of internal capital transfers and interest conflicting under the control of major shareholders GONG Zhi-wen, CHEN Jin-long ( Scb∞11 of Business Administration, HuaqiωUniVI町sity， Quanzhou 362021 , China) Abstract: 咀üs paper constructs a model to illustrate the optimization of capital transfers within an enterprise group which was controlled by major shareholders. 白le capital transfers behavior is investigate by means of the model , which gives the equilibrium results , benefits of all parties involved and the influencing factors under three circumstances. The results show 也at capital allocation optimization and social welfare maximization may result in the ideal intemal capital transactions , in a win-win situation for all parties , and the achievement ofthe groups financial goals. While the intemal capital transactions can be kept and financial goals can be met in the intemal capital transactions with conflicting co邸， insufficient capital transfers may result. An excessive capital 位ansfer may result in 也e infringed 凶.temal capital transactions , where the intemal capital allocation W田not