基于演化博弈视角的政府预算博弈模型设计及分析.pdfVIP

运筹与 管理 Vo 1. 21 ,No.4 第 21 卷第4 期 2012 年 8 月 OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Aug.2012 基于演化博弈视角的政府预算博弈模型设计及分析 公库德 (南京审计学院国际审计学院，江苏南京 211815) 摘 要:针对政府预算体系，由于部门采取的行为策略是基于有限理性而做出的，所以博弈双方的策略选择实际 上是不断调整的，并且是根据对方策略的变化而不断变化的。因此，运用演化博弈工具来研究政政府预算体系 更符合现实情况。基于此，从演化博弈理论的研究视角探讨了预算审批部门、预算申报部门和财政支出部门决 策的演化过程，建立了预算审批部门和预算申报部门以及财政支出部门之间的演化博弈模型。分析了审批部 门、申报部门和支出部门的行为特征，根据复制者动态方程得到了参与者的行为演化规律和行为演化稳定策略。 最后，文章通过数值算例对结论进行了论证。 关键词z 公共管理:政府预算;有限理性;演化博弈;演化稳定策略 中图分类号:目24.32 文章标识码:A 文章编号: 1007-3221 (2012) 04-0074 -07 Model Design and Analysis of Government Budget Based on Evolutionary Game Theory GONG Yan-de (School olInternational Audit , Nanjing Audit College , Nanjing 211815 , China) Abstract :For the government budget system , the departments strategy is taken based on the finite rational , so , the bilateral strategies is actually continuously adjusted , Therefore , it is more realistic for us to study government budget system with evolutionary game. Evolution between budget approval department and reporting departments (or between spending departments) is discussed from the perspective of evolutionary game theory , and the evolu- tionary game model is also established. Behavioral characteristics of approval department , reporting departments and spending departments are analy:zed; behavior evolutionary law and evolutionary stable strategy are given according to dynamic equation. Finally , this paper proves the conclusion with a numerical example. Key words: public management; government budget , bounded rationality; evolutionary game , evolutionarý stabl