政府补贴背景下制造商和零售商博弈研究.pdfVIP

《软科掌}2011 年 9 月·第 25 卷·第 9 期(总第 141 期) l管理科学1 政府非脑背景r制造商和零售商博弈研究 柳键，邱国斌 (江西财经大学信息管理学院，南昌 33∞13 ) 摘要:基于非合作博弈模型与合作博弈模型研究制造商和零售商之间的关系以及政府补贴对企业带来的影响。结 果表明，产品价格随着政府补贴的增加而增加，且非合作博弈情形下产品价格比合作博弈情形下产品价格增加更 快;企业销售额随着政府补贴的增加而增加，而且，合作情形下销售额的增速更大，所以，补贴政策有助于剌激需 求;企业利润随政府补贴的增加而增加，且合作情形下利润增长更快，补贴政策对企业也是有利的;合作情形下的 企业利润高于非合作情形下的企业利润，且政府补贴越大，合作比不合作多带来的利润越大，企业更加愿意合作。 关键词:政府补贴:制造商;零售商;非合作博弈:合作博弈 中圄分类号:目24.32 文章编号:1∞1-8409(2011)09-∞48 -06 文献标识码:A Research on the Game between Manufacturers and Retailers in the Background of Government 5 Subsidy UU Jian , QIU Guo-Bin (School (扩 lr阱rmation Tec/uωwgy， Jial飞gXi University 01 Finance arul onam白， Nanc.缸ng 33∞13) Abstr田t: Relationship between manufacturer and retailer and the impact of govemment s subsidy on ente叩d田s are studied based on c∞perative and non-c∞perative 伊me models.ηle results show that: product price increases with the govemment s subsidies , and product price in non-c∞perative 伊me situation increases faster than that in c∞perative 伊me situation; enterprise s sale increωes with 由e govemment s subsidy , and the sale in c∞perative game situation in- Cl1四ses faster; thus subsidy policy helpsωstimulate demand; ente叩rise s profit increases with the govemn随时s subsi- dies , and profit in c∞perative 伊me situation increases faster than in non-c∞perative 伊me situation; subsidy policy is also favorable to enterprises; profit in c∞严rative 伊me situation is higher than in non-c∞perative game situation; c∞p eration can bring more profit than non-c∞peration with larger govemment s subsidy; companies 缸e willing to c∞perate. Key words: govemme时s subsidy; manufacturer; retai