敌手分类的Stackelberg博弈分析.pdfVIP

第 25 替第1 期 电子测暨与仪据学报 协1.25 No.l • 96 • JOURNAL OF ELE ClRONIC Mι， ItSUREMENTAND INSTRUMENT 2011 年 1 月 DOI: 1O.3724/SP.J.l 187.201 1.α)()96 敌手分类的 Stackelberg 博弈分析* 邓蔚钱伟中傅肿秦志光 (电子科技大学计算机科学与工程学院，成都 611731) 摘 耍:在实际电子测量分类系统中，随着机辑学习技术的广泛应用，它面临着来自对抗性环境中敌手攻击的巨大挑战。 利用非合作工人Stackelberg 博弈，井结合实际存在的跟随者反应时延问题对敌手和数据挖掘者之间的交互行为进行了建模。和 以前工作不同之处，在于本模型中考虑了跟随者反应时间对领导者和跟随者收益的影响。首先对Stackelberg 博弈间睡进行了形 式化描述，然后对敌手分类问蹦进行了博弈建模，撒点分析了此条件下博弈双方的收菇，最后测试了本棋姻的正确性和有般性。 实验结果表明，应该密切注意异常数据的变化，从而更好的对抗敌手攻击。 关键词:敌手攻击;散子分费; Stackelberg 博弈;纳什均衡;反应时延 中图分费号: TP181 文献标识码:A 国家标准学科分类代码: 520.2010 Stackelberg game based theoretical analysis for adversarial c1assification Deng Weì Qìan Weizhong Fu Chong Qìn Zhìguang (School of Computer Science and Engineering ,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731 ,China) Abstract: Wi出 the wide applications of machine leaming technologies in practical classification systems of elec翩 tronic measurement, they are facing the great challenges of adversarial attacks from adversarial environments. Combining with reaction-time delay of the follower, we model the interaction between the spammer and the data miner as a two-person sequential non唰cooperative Stackelberg game in this paper. Different from the past researches , the influences of reaction-time delay for the leader and fol1ower are considered. First we formulize Stackelberg game. Then we model adversarial classification problem as a Stackelberg g创ne in which our emphasis is on analyzing the payoffs of the leader and follower under the followers reaction-time delay. At last, the models correctness and effectiveness are verified 伽rough our exp~riments.ηle experiment results show that we should pay more attention to the change