考虑公平偏好的两级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型.pdfVIP

第 15 卷第4 期 Vol. 15 No.4 工业工程 20口年8 月 Industrial Engineering Joumal August 2012 doi: 10. 3969/j. issn. 1007-7375.2012.04.006 考虑公平偏好的两级供应链 Stackelberg 博弈模型 王勇，朱龙涛 (重庆大学经济与工商管理学院，重庆物∞44) 摘要:针对供应链中存在的公平偏好问题，构建了一个考虑公平偏好的两级供应链Stackelberg 博弈模型。通过引入 参照点效应建立公平偏好效用函数，分析了仅零售商具有公平偏好、仅供应商具有公平偏好和二者均具有公平偏好 3 种情况下公平偏好对供应链均衡策略的影响。研究结果表明:公平偏好改变了销售收益分享率和零售商的努力水 平，影响供应商和零售商的效用值，并且公平偏好程度越大，对双方效用的影响越明显。 关键词:供应链;公平偏好; Stackelberg 博弈;行为运作 中图分类号:F274 文献标志码:A 文章编号:1007-7375(2012)04-∞28-07 Stackelberg Game Model for Two-Level Supply Chain with Fairness Preference Wang Yo吨， Zhu umg-tao (School of Economics and Business Administration , Chon阴ing University , Chongqing 40∞44 ， China) Abstract: Fairness preference has significant effect on the operation in a supply chain. With fairness preι erence taken into account in this paper , a Stackelberg game model is developed for a two-level supply chain. Further , utility functions are established by introducing reference point effect. Then the effect of fairness on the supply chain partners strategies is analyzed for three cases: the retailer concerns about fair- ness only , the supplier concerns about fairness only , and both pa时ners concern about fairness. Results show that fairness preference changes the revenue sharing rate and the retailers effort level. Also , fairness preference influences partners utility values in a supply chain , and the greater the fairness degree is , the more obvious the inf1uence is. Key words: supply chain; fairness preference; Stackelberg game; behavioral operation 行为科学认为，在实际的经济运行中经济主体