the recursive core for non-superadditive games递归non-superadditive游戏的核心.pdfVIP

Games 2010, 1, 66-88; doi:10.3390/g1020066 OPEN ACCESS games ISSN 2073-4336 /journal/games Article The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games ¨ ¨ Chen-Ying Huang , Tomas Sjostrom Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, 21 Hsu-Chow Road, Taipei, Taiwan Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08901, USA Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-Mail: tsjostrom@; Tel.: +1-732-932-7362; Fax: +1-732-932-7416. Received: 23 January 2010; in revised form: 2 April 2010 / Accepted: 8 April 2010 / Published: 15 April 2010 ¨ ¨ Abstract: We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjostrom [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the -core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any restrictions, such as stationarity, on strategies. Keywords: coalition formation; non-cooperative implementation; partition function; recur- sive core 1. Introduction Characteristic functions are used to study games without externalities across coalitions. If coalitions have unhampered ability to sign bindin