高管晋升激励与财务舞弊——来自上市公司的经验证据.docVIP

高管晋升激励与财务舞弊——来自上市公司的经验证据 张洪辉 章琳一 江西财经大学会计学院 X 关注成功！ 加关注后您将方便地在 我的关注中得到本文献的被引频次变化的通知！ 新浪微博 腾讯微博 人人网 开心网 豆瓣网 网易微博 摘????要： 本文利用2008—2013年中国上市公司的舞弊数据, 采用混合样本和配对样本方法研究了高管晋升激励与财务舞弊之间的关系。研究发现: (1) 晋升激励与财务舞弊负相关, 而且晋升激励与公司财务舞弊的次数负相关。 (2) 考虑高管变更, 发生CEO变更的年份, 晋升激励对财务舞弊的抑制效应明显要弱于没有发生CEO变更的年份。 (3) 考虑继任者的来源, 发现如果继任高管来自职业经理人, 该类公司的晋升激励对财务舞弊的抑制作用明显要比继任高管来自控股股东的强。 (4) 考虑ST类、非ST类公司的晋升激励差异, 发现对于具有较强舞弊压力的ST类公司而言, 晋升激励对财务舞弊的抑制作用要比非ST类公司的强。此外, 本文也考虑了高管权力因素的影响, 发现高管权力并不能影响本文的实证结论。 关键词： 高管; 晋升激励; 晋升概率; 财务舞弊; 作者简介：张洪辉 (1981-) , 男, 湖北鄂州人, 讲师, 管理学博士, 研究领域是会计与公司财务;E-mail:danordio@163.com; 作者简介：章琳一 (1984-) , 女, 江西新余人, 讲师, 管理学博士, 研究领域是会计与审计, E-mail:01zhang0125@163.com。 收稿日期：2016-06-15 Managerial Tournament Incentive and Financial Fraud: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies ZHANG Hong-hui ZHANG Lin-yi School of Accountancy of Jiangxi University of Finance Economics; Abstract： Promotion incentive is a kind of implicit incentives for executives, which can bring more power, perk, reputation and even money. On the contrast, there is a explicit incentive which can be measured as salary, bonus and option. Based on Lazear Rosen ( 1981) , which argue that there is a tournament incentive in economic organizations in the form of promotion, more and more papers starts to study tournament effect on firms. Among the existing literatures, most of them care about tournament incentive effect on corporate performance. However, as Zhang et al. ( 2013) argue that tournament incentive effect on corporate performance must base on corporate behavior which in forms of investing, financing behavior and so on. There is a gap on this topic for few literature pay attention to corporate behavior affected by tournament incentive. and there is little paper focusing on the tournament incentive effect on corporate financial fraud.This paper is the first one to analyze tournament effect on corporate fraud behavior with the data of China. By using fraud data of Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2015, we id