平狄克微观经济学Markets with Asymmetric InformationPPT.ppt

Chapter 17 38 42 43 48 48 50 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 65 67 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 69 70 72 74 78 79 80 81 88 2 4 6 17 25 26 34 35 Determining the Levelof Educational Spending Educational spending per pupil $0 Willingness to pay $ $1200 $600 $1800 $2400 AW The efficient level of educational spending is determined by summing the willingness to pay for education for each of three citizens. Will majority rule yield an efficient outcome? W1 will vote for $600 W2 and W3 will vote for $1200 The median vote will always win in a majority rule election. W2 W3 W1 Private Preferences for Public Goods Question Will the median voter selection always be efficient? Answer If two of the three preferred $1200, there would be over-investment If two of the three preferred $600, there would be under-investment Private Preferences for Public Goods Majority rule is inefficient because it weighs each citizen’s preference equally The efficient outcome weighs each citizen’s vote by his or her strength of preference 2 4 5 6 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 23 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 40 41 42 43 44 48 49 52 Refundable Deposits Amount of Glass $ D Price falls to P’ and the amount of recycled glass increases to M*. Sv Sr S The supply of glass is the sum of the supply of virgin glass (SV) and the supply of recycled glass (Sr). M1 P Without refunds the price of glass is P and Sr is M1. S’r S’ P’ M* With refunds Sr increases to S’r and S increases to S’. Externalities and Property Rights Property Rights Legal rules describing what people or firms may do with their property For example: If residents downstream owned the river (clean water) they would control upstream emissions Externalities and Property Rights Bargaining and Economic Efficiency Economic efficiency can be achieved without government intervention when the externality affects relatively few parties and when property rights are well specified Profits Under AlternativeEmissions Choices (Daily) Externalities and Proper