资讯性，激励补偿和缓冲库存的选择[文献翻译]2011-01-11.docVIP

外文文献翻译译文 外文原文 原文： Informativeness, Incentive Compensation, and the Choice of Inventory Buffer Baiman, Stanley; Netessine, Serguei; Saouma, Richard Most of the agency theory work in managerial accounting has studied the relation between performance metric properties e.g., informativeness, precision, congruity and optimal incentive compensation, holding fixed the firm’s other organizational design decisions
e.g., hierarchical structure, job assignment, production technology. However, by holding fixed these other organizational design choices, one cannot study whether and how they affect the performance metric properties. As Hemmer
1998, 321–322 notes, “the value of a performance measure is determined not simply by its congruity and precision but by its influence on the optimal organizational design Much of the recent theoretical accounting literature has largely ignored complementarities between performance measures and organizational design.” In this study, we expand on Hemmer’s
1998 observation by studying how the informativenessand incentive properties of a performance metric are influenced by one of the firm’s organizational design choices—the size of its inventory buffers. The introduction of just-in-time
JITand, more generally, lean manufacturing has led to an increased emphasis on controlling and reducing inventory levels. Managerial accounting has responded to this reduction in inventory with new costing techniques such as back flush costing
Horngren et al. 2008. However, we show that the choice of inventory buffers has a more subtle effect on the design of the managerial accounting system, in that it affects the informativeness of performance metrics produced by the managerial accounting system. Similar to our model, Hemmer
1995, 1998 and Gietzmann and Hemmer
2002 examine how different workflow arrangements between agents affect the information available for contracting, and the incentives facing agents. Our work is distinct from these