内部私人关系与中小板上市公司总经理激励.docVIP

内部私人关系与中小板上市公司总经理 激励 田祥宇李颖张志维 山西财经大学会计学院 本文以2010-2014年屮小板上市公司为研究对象，首先检验丫总经理与董事长 之间的私人关系对总经理薪酬-业缋敏感性的影响，发现总经理与董事长之间存 在“可辨别私人关系”比不存在私人关系时，总经理的薪酬-业绩敏感性更强； 然后考察私人关系建立的途径，发现只有通过职业途径建立私人关系，即总经 理与萧事长之间存在“前同事关系”时，总经理薪酬-业绩敏感性才会更强，而 非职业途径建立的私人关系并不具有这种“增强效应”；最后对比业绩上升与下 降时私人关系对薪酬-业绩敏感性的影响，发现业绩下滑时仍会出现薪酬粘性。 本文的研宄结论既丰富了 “关系与经理人激励”的文献，也有助于中小板上市 公司更加全面地理解改善薪酬激励契约的有效途径。 关键词： 私人关系;职业途径;薪酬-业绩敏感性; 基金：2014年国家社会科学基金项0 “构建农村基础设施投资公平性的政策保 障机制研宄” (14JBY097) Internal Personal Connections and Pay-performance Sensitivity of SME Board Company TIAN Xiangvu LI Ying ZHANG Zhiwei Shanxi University of Financial and Economics; Abstract： The paper examines the impact of the personal connections between the general manager and chairman of the board on the compensation performance sensitivity of the firms in the small and mediumsized board from 2010 to 2014. The study shows that compared to non-personal relationships samples, the samples with a personal relationship have stronger executive compensation performance sensitivity. Secondly, considering how the pathway established, the compensation performance sensitivity is stronger in the samples which the personal relationships have been established by career paths than in the samples which the personal relationships have been established by non-career paths.Thirdly, pay performance sensitivity is stronger in the companies which performance has been enhanced than in the companies which the performance decreased. These results enriched the literatures of “the relationship and the manager incentive”，and the results can also encourage small and medium board listed companies to understand how to improve their incentive system on a relationship point. Keyword： Internal Personal Connections; Career path; Pay-performance Sensitivity; 一、引言 薪酬激励是降低委托代理成本，实现经理人与股东目标兼容的主要治理机制之 一(Jensen 和 Meckling，1976; Jensen 和 Murphy, 1990)。大量研究发现经理 人薪酬对公司业绩是敏感的(张俊瑞等，2003;杜胜利、翟艳玲，2005;李维安、 张国萍,2005;Leone 等，2006;杜兴强、王丽华,2007; Jackson 等,2008),意 味着薪酬激励契约基木有效。上市公司高管内部私人关系(personal conne