[经济学]公共经济学3——管制理论1.pdfVIP

Public Sector Economics — MSc Econ 2011 3. Regulation I Paul Schweinzer November 8, 2011. 1 / 37 Public Sector Economics: Lecture 3 Incomplete info Model 1 First-best Second-best Model 2 First-best Second-best Summary Regulation under incomplete information Until now we assumed that there is common knowledge on cost functions, preferences and that there are no moral hazard nor adverse selection problems in the production of public goods. Think of the regulation of network industries such as railways, telecommunications or electricity. A network can be viewed as a non-rival good. While there are large fixed costs of constructing such a network, the variable costs of admitting an additional user are often very low. Under the assumption of common knowledge on preferences, we’ve seen in the previous sections that is always possible to reach an efficient allocation as the ‘command optimum’ of an economy where a benevolent planner allocates resources in such a way that an efficient allocation of public goods results. But if your payoff depends on your reported preferences , will you tell the planner? 2 / 37 Public Sector Economics: Lecture 3 Incomplete info Model 1 First-best Second-best Model 2 First-best Second-best Summary Incomplete information: Participation The main question is whether public goods can be provided in an efficient way if individuals have private information. The answer depends on whether participation is voluntary or whether players can be forced to pay for public goods (that they may not value). It turns out that: ◮ If participation is voluntary, then it is generally